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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS:
SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
INTRODUCTION

One of the central purposes of the federal securities laws' was to protect2 passive, uninformed investors.3 Accordingly, Congress sought to
ensure provision of otherwise unavailable information to these investors.4
Congress expected that with this information investors would have the
tools necessary to protect their interests and would avoid investing in
unsound, worthless, or fraudulent securities.5
General partners are not usually viewed by courts as needing the protections offered by the federal securities laws6 because they are assumed
1. For purposes of this Note the term "federal securities laws" refers to the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (1982)) and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
2. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2305 (1985); United States
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953); Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d
33, 39 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 147 (1985); Lank v. New York Stock Exch., 548
F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1977); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); H.R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1-4 (1933).
3. See Slevin v. Pedersen Assocs., 540 F. Supp. 437, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("securities laws were enacted to provide surveillance for those not in a position to monitor their
own investments... [and to] protect the integrity of financial interests that unsuspecting
investors are incapable of investigating for themselves"); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan
Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (investors usually knew little about
the actual operation of companies they were investing in).
4. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (1933 Act designed to
give investors full disclosure of material information about public offerings of securities
and protect investors against fraud); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (a
central purpose of the 1934 Act is to protect investors by requiring full disclosure by
issuers); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (fundamental purpose of securities laws was to substitute full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.) (1934 Act's goal is to
give the investing public the opportunity to make knowing and intelligent decisions), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934) ("One of the
prime concerns of the exchanges should be to make available to the public, honest, complete, and correct information regarding the securities listed."); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (1933 Act aims "to place adequate and true information before
the investor").
5. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.) (1934 Act designed to "protect the public from inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information"), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 950 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (letter from
President Franklin Roosevelt to Congressman Sam Rayburn) ("[w]e must eliminate unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation [on the stock exchanges]"); S. Rep. No.
47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (1933 Act's aim is to prevent the sale of worthless
securities through misrepresentation).
6. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
118 (1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Vincent v.
Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 436 (10th Cir. 1973); Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238, 243
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to possess powers and responsibilities 7 that would enable them to protect
their partnership interests. Such classic general partners should expect
to reap profits through their own efforts and active participation' in the
venture rather than simply through the efforts of others.
Some promoters have sought to take advantage of this judicial position
by trying to masquerade a security as a general partnership interest to
avoid the regulatory requirements and potential liabilities imposed by the
securities laws.9 Federal courts, recognizing the potential for this type of
masquerade in the context of other investment vehicles,"0 have followed
a Supreme Court mandate to examine the economic realities of an investment scheme rather than its appearance to determine whether the partic-

ular scheme will be considered a security and thus fall within the ambit
of the federal securities laws. In the Supreme Court's analysis, the substance rather than the form of the scheme should govern. "
A classic general partner trying to prove that his general partnership
(E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 701 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1982); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan
Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp.
1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); New York Stock Exch.
v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
7. See SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 356 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v.
Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Odom v.
Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp.
1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.) § 18 (1914) (rules determining rights and duties of partners); id.
§ 19 (giving partner right to inspect and copy partnership records); id. § 20 (partners
must provide information of anything affecting partnership to any partner or to representative of any deceased or disabled partner). A classic general partner is one who enjoys
the rights set out in the U.P.A.
8. Slevin v. Pederson Assocs., 540 F. Supp. 437, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting R.
Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 252 (4th ed. 1977)).
9. See McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 783 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134, 136-37 (N.D. Il1. 1983); Morrison v.
Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 98,863, at 94,480
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982); Brodsky, General PartnershipInterests as Securities, 190
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
10. The federal courts have found the existence of a security in a variety of interesting
contexts. See Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (contracts
involving the sale of earthworms); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d
414, 417 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchilla contracts); SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134, 1137
(5th Cir. 1969) (letter offering interests in underwater oil mining claims), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 972 (1970); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 471 (10th Cir. 1967)
(contracts involving sale of beavers), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968); Roe v. United
States, 287 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir.) (sales of mineral leases on specific pieces of property),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746, 750-51 (9th Cir.)
(bottling contracts received in exchange for whiskey warehouse receipts), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 768 (1944); McLish v. Harris Farms, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1075, 1080-85 (E.D.
Cal. 1980) (purchase of cattle); SEC v. Western Pac. Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [19741975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,064, at 97,730 (D. Nev. Jan. 30,
1975) (sales agreements involving gold coins and silver bars); Ferland v. Orange Groves
of Florida, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690, 703 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (sales of orange grove interests).
11. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
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interest constitutes a security' 2 faces a difficult burden' 3 because he is
presumed able to protect his own investment. To satisfy this burden,
some courts have noted that the general partner must prove that despite
the partnership form, he was so dependent on the promoter or a third
party that he was in fact unable to exercise meaningful partnership powers.14 In fact, not all courts have given the general partner such an opportunity but have simply held as a matter of law that a general
partnership interest cannot be considered a security. 5
U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943).
12. Often the complaining general partner will invoke the antifraud provisions of the
1933 Act and/or the 1934 Act, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 771(1), (2) (1982); id. § 77q(a); id.
§ 78j(b), and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and any rights
under state law, see, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 101 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 213 (6th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 739 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1203 (1983); Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134, 135 (N.D. I1. 1983);
Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.
1977). In addition, the complaining general partner will be trying to gain all the advantages of being in federal court. For example, the general partner will have broader discovery rights in federal court. See E. Brodsky, Guide to Securities Litigation 326 (1974).
If the general partner is also bringing some state law claims, the federal court will probably exercise pendent jurisdiction over such claims, because the federal and state claims
will normally arise from the same operative facts. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
If the general partner's interests are considered securities, the promoter or issuer may
be required to register as a broker or dealer under § 15 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(1982), if he is not exempt from registration. The promoter may also have to consider the
possibility of registering the initial offering under § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1982), if he is unable to find an exemption.
This issue will often arise in the context of either a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or a motion to dismiss on summary judgment, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 101 (3d Cir.) (Rule 12(b)(6)),
cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (Rule 12(c) motion turned into Rule 56 motion); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 409 (5th Cir.) (Rules 12(b)(1) and 56), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); McConnell
v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 782 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (Rules 12(b)(1)
and 56); Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,863, at 94,480 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982) (Rule 12(b)).
13. See Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1983); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 454 U.S.
897 (1981); cf Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (defendant
did not overcome burden of showing that his partnership interest was a limited one).
14. See Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Gordon v.
Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Williamson
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cerl denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Morrison v.
Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863, at 94,481
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982).
15. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
118 (1984); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d
750 (2d Cir. 1977); New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); cf. Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (federal securities
jurisdiction should not be extended to general partners where duties have been delegated), aff'd, 701 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1982).
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This Note argues that an investment should not lose the protections of
the federal securities laws simply because it is in the form of a general
partnership interest. Rather, the economic realities of the scheme should
govern. Part I will analyze the Howey test,1 6 the current formula used to
determine whether a particular scheme classifies as an investment contract and thus a security, and the Howey test's relevance to general partnership interests. Part II will describe the present controversy
concerning whether general partnership interests should ever be considered securities. Part III will conclude that under certain circumstances
general partnership interests should be treated as securities. Part III will
also set forth a proposed sequence of analysis for determining the securities status of general partnership interests on a case-by-case basis.
I.

HOWEY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO GENERAL
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS

A.

The Howey Test

The Securities Act of 1933' 7 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934" (1934 Act) both include within their definitions of a security 19 the terms "certificate of interest or participation in any profit shar16. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). There has been much
scholarly discussion of Howey. See, e.g., FitzGibbon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participatein the FinancialMarkets, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 893
(1980) [hereinafter cited as What is a Security?]; Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of
Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 Hastings L.J. 219 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Importance of Risk]; Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstreamof SecuritiesRegulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as Securities Regulation]; Newton, What is a Security? A CriticalAnalysis, 48
Miss. L.J. 167 (1977); Tew & Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parametersof the Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser,27 U. Miami L. Rev. 407 (1973); Comment, Catch-All
Investment Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise Require, 14 Cum. L. Rev. 135
(1984).
17. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)).
18. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)). The
issue of whether a general partnership interest can be considered a security has also arisen
in the context of The Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (1982)). If a company is considered
an investment company under § 3(a) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1982), it
must either register under the Act or qualify for an exemption. See, e.g., FCA Realty
Fund, No-Action Letter, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 77,841,
at 79,233 (available Nov. 13, 1984) (whether a realty fund was an investment company
turned on whether the general partnership interests the fund was acquiring were securities); Realex Capital Corp., No-Action Letter, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,611, at 78,843 (available Mar. 19, 1984) (exemption under § 3(c)(5)(C) of
1940 Act not available to issuer if underlying partnership was a general partnership because general partnership interests would be investment contracts and thus securities);
MSA Realty Corp., No-Action Letter, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
77,610, at 79,839-40 (available Mar. 19, 1984) (real estate investment trust planning to
invest in a shopping center as a general partner granted exemption under § 3(c)(5)(C) of
the 1940 Act).
19. Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
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ing agreement" and "investment contract."2 0 Neither Act refers directly
to partnership interests. The Uniform Partnership Act2 (U.P.A.), however, defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit."' This definition appears to
bring partnership agreements within the definition of securities in that
they entail certificates of interest or participations in a profit-sharing
agreement. 23 The Supreme Court has stated, however, that a profit-shar[U]nless the context otherwise requires-(1) The term "security" means any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharingagreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof),
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982) (emphases added).
Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires-.... (10) The term "security" means
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificateof interest orparticipation in any profit-sharingagreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) (emphases added).
20. The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that the definition of a security in § 2(l)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982), is virtually identical to the definition of a
security in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). See Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 556 n.7 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 & n.12
(1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967); see also S. Rep. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) (definition of security in 1934 Act substantially same as
1933 Act). Therefore, for purposes of this Note the two definitions will be regarded as
the same.
21. The U.P.A. has been adopted in 48 states and the District of Columbia. The only
states that have not adopted the Act are Georgia and Louisiana. The Act has also been
adopted in Guam and the Virgin Islands. See 6 U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1985).
22. U.P.A. § 6 (1914).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7Th(l), 78c(a)(10) (1982).
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ing agreement alone is not sufficient to make an agreement a security. 24

Courts confronted with the issue of whether a general partnership interest constitutes a security have considered whether the interest satisfies

the definition of an investment contract 25 set forth in the seminal case
24. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.11 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 118 (1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Wagner
v. Bear, Steams & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,032,
at 94,913 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
Some courts have considered whether the partnership was a bona fide partnership or a
partnership in the accepted sense. See Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 436 (10th Cir.
1973); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1977); Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Solomont
v. Polk Dev. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 498, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22, 28-29 (1966); Rivlin v.
Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 23, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587, 594 (1961); Garbo v. Hilleary
Franchise Sys., 479 S.W.2d 491, 500-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). This test was initially
discussed in the context of the California Corporate Securities Act. See Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the CaliforniaCorporateSecuritiesAct, 33 Calif. L. Rev.
343, 361-65 (1945). The test is based on the view that a bona fide partnership is not a
security.
The most important consideration in determining whether a partnership is bona fide is
the presence of the right of delectus personae, the right to determine membership. Id. at
363. This notion was codified in the U.P.A.: "no person can become a member of a
partnership without the consent of all the partners." U.P.A. § 18(g) (1914). Thus, to be
a bona fide partnership, all the partners must have the right to select all the other partners. In addition, if partnership interests are offered to the public, the partnership cannot
be bona fide. Dahlquist, supra, at 363. Lastly, if the holders of the interests have no
personal relationship with one another, the partnership will not be bona fide since most
partners, it is said, have a close personal relationship. Id.
Dahlquist's bona fide partnership test has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Long,
Partnership,Limited Partnershipand Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. Rev.
581, 606-11 (1972). The criticism notes that a partnership that allows people to become
partners without the consent of the other partners is not merely a non-bona fide partnership, but actually not a partnership at all, although nothing in partnership law prevents
the public solicitation of new partners. Id. at 609. Thus, the factors considered by the
bona fide partnership test will not help distinguish between the passive investor and the
active general partner.
This kind of test has not often been used in the federal courts, and when it has been
mentioned the courts have also relied on the Howey test. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench,
473 F.2d 430, 436 (10th Cir. 1973); Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F. Supp. 1365, 1386-87
(D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1978); Hirsch v.
duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977);
Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 900-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Some courts that have considered whether an investor's interest constitutes a security
have also employed a risk capital analysis. Such an analysis was initially used in Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815-16, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961) (en banc) where the California Supreme Court held that membership interests in a country club were securities because the investors risked their capital in an enterprise managed by others. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
It was irrelevant whether they expected a return on their capital as long as the investors
received some benefit. This test focuses on what an investor stands to lose retrospectively
and not what he expects to gain.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Commissioner of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc.,
52 Hawaii 642, 648-49, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (1971) also adopted a risk capital test. This
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defining that term, SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.26
In Howey, the Howey Company offered investors interests in approximately 250 acres of a citrus grove development, along with a service contract to harvest, cultivate and market the crop." In holding that the
offering was an investment contract the Supreme Court set forth a four
part test to determine whether an investment scheme was an investment
contract. 28 To be considered an investment contract, the contract, transaction or scheme under scrutiny must be one in which a person 1) invests
his money 2) in a common enterprise and 3) is led to expect profits
4) solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party. 9
The Howey test seems mechanical on its face, but the Supreme Court
emphasized that the term investment contract "embodies a flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
test was originally set forth in Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security". Is There a
More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 367, 377 (1967). Noting that the Howey
test was too mechanical to protect the investing public, the court stated that
an investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable
benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree
as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
HawaiiMkt Center, 52 Hawaii at 648-49, 485 P.2d at 109 (footnote omitted).
While risk capital tests have been supported by other commentators, see, e.g., What Is
a Security?, supra note 16, at 908-12; Importance of Risk, supra note 16, at 244-49; Securities Regulation, supra note 16, at 167-70; Securities Regulation: "Beneficial Interest in
Title to Property" as a Security-Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski (Cal. 1961), 50
Calif. L. Rev. 156 (1962); Note, Securities Regulation: Risk Capital-Twenty Years After
Silver Hills, 35 Okla. L. Rev. 436 (1982), they have not been frequently employed by the
federal courts. Such tests have been used in the context of deciding whether certain debt
instruments are securities. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th
Cir. 1976); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228-30 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). It does appear, however, that the fourth prong of this approach was influential in the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the "efforts" prong of
Howey in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973). See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
26. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
27. See id. at 295.
28. See id. at 298-99. In defining the term "investment contract," the Court did not
specifically refer to the test as a four part test. The federal courts in interpreting Howey,
however, have broken the test down into distinct elements. See, e.g., Hunssinger v. Rockford Bus. Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 489 (7th Cir. 1984) (breaking down the Howey test
into four parts); Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d 1490, 1494 (8th Cir. 1984)
(same); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 702 F.2d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1984) (same);
United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1114 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); see also Odom
v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (breaking down the Howey test
into three parts); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 740 (11th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1979) (same).
29. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
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money of others on the promise of profits." 3 ° This construction has led
the federal courts to interpret the elements of the Howey test broadly. 3 I
B.

The Significance of the Howey Test
to General PartnershipInterests

A general partnership interest will normally satisfy the first three
prongs of the Howey test.32 In most cases the general partner will have
made an investment into the partnership in the form of a capital contribution,33 expecting to receive profits.3 4 In addition, a general partnership
will normally be considered a common enterprise.3 5
30. Id. at 299.
31. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Williamson v. Tucker, 645
F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See infra notes
32-44 and accompanying text.
32. See Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 99,032, at 94,913 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982).
33. See J. Mulder, M. Volz & A. Berger, The Drafting of Partnership Agreements 12
(1967); cf. U.P.A. § 18(a), (c) (1914). This contribution will usually be in the form of
money, although a contribution of goods or services will satisfy the Howey test as long as
it is not designed to enhance the profitability of the investment. See International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 & n.12 (1979); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan
Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
The Ninth Circuit has gone so far as to hold that the use of investors' credit in the form
of a promissory note was sufficient to satisfy the "investment of money" prong of the
Howey test. See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); El
Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974).
34. An enterprise cannot be considered a partnership unless it was organized to make
a profit for its members. See generally J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership § 13,
at 63-65 (1968). The Supreme Court has noted that this prong of the Howey test may be
satisfied either by profits generated through a capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment or by having the investors participate in the earnings
that have resulted from the use of their funds. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)
and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)). It is also possible that potential tax
benefits could satisfy the requirement of profits. This issue can be very important in
determining whether partnership interests can qualify as securities, because investors frequently choose to invest in a partnership mainly because of its potential tax benefits.
Since the expectation of a tax saving may have actually induced the investment, it is
arguable that this potential tax benefit should be considered an investor's expected profit
satisfying the third prong of the Howey test. See SEC v. International Mining Exch.,
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1981); Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1981); Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
The Supreme Court noted in Forman, 421 U.S. at 855 (1975), that certain tax benefits
did not qualify as profits. These tax benefits were of the type available to all homeowners.
Id. at 855. In a footnote, the Court stated that even if tax deductions were considered
profits, they could not be said to derive from a "security investment" if they did not result
from the managerial efforts of others. See id. at 855 n.20.
35. Another issue arises as to what degree of commonality must be present in order
for the Howey test to be satisfied. Some courts require the presence of horizontal commonality, which is a comingling of the various funds or a private sharing of profits. See
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The determination of whether a general partnership interest is an investment contract will turn on one of the most litigated aspects of the
Howey test: whether profits are expected solely from the efforts of others.
A literal reading of the word "solely" would almost always prevent a
general partnership interest from being an investment contract because
general partners, given their participatory role in the enterprise, will not
depend solely on the efforts of others for profits. Promoters of investment schemes would be able to evade the securities laws36 by creating
investments in the form of general partnership interests and by requiring
the investing general partners to "contribute a modicum of effort" to the
scheme.3 7 Such schemes would thwart the remedial purposes behind the
securities laws.38
Realizing this potential for abuse, the Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises,39 noted that it would adopt a more realistic approach to investment contract analysis.' The Ninth Circuit stated that a
court must determine "whether the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.""
This interpretation of the Howey test recognizes that even when an
Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982)
(investment did not satisfy Howey test because it was not part of a pooled group of funds);
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222-24 (6th Cir.
1980) (a relationship that ties the fortunes of each investor to the success of the overall
venture is required), aff'd on other grounds,456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research
Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977) ("a sharing or pooling of funds is required
by Howey"). Other courts require the presence of vertical commonality for the investor
and promoter to be engaged in a common enterprise. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[tihe critical factor is ... the uniformity of
impact of the promoter's efforts"); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482
n.7 (9th Cir.) (the fortunes of the investor must be "interwoven with and dependent upon
the efforts... of those seeking the investment or of third parties"), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973). See generally Note, DiscretionaryCommodity Accounts as Securities. An Application of the Howey Test, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 639, 646-50 (1984) (discussing the circuit courts' differing analyses of the common enterprise requirement).
36. See Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214-15 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476,
482 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Rogers v. Cowley, [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 99,178, at 95,684 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1983).
37. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied.
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
38. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974); Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d
1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Rogers v. Cowley,
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,178, at 95,684 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 14, 1983); cf In re Caesars Palace See. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (court adopted liberal interpretation of privity requirement under § 12(2) of 1933
Act in recognition of Act's remedial nature).
39. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
40. See id. at 482.
41. Id.
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investor performs some very minor, nominal services for an investment

scheme,42 the investor may still lack access to the information necessary
to enable him to protect his investment.4" Most circuits have accepted
this interpretation of Howey. 44
II.

THE CONTROVERSY

There is disagreement on whether a general partnership interest can
ever be considered a security for purposes of the federal securities laws.
Under one view general partnership interests cannot be securities as a
matter of law because general partners possess certain statutory powers.4 5 The other view focuses on the factual reality of the given case and
analyzes the actual rights and abilities of the general partner.4 6 Both
approaches purport to place central importance on the "efforts" or
"solely" prong of the Howey test.4 7
42. For example, while the investors in Glenn W Turner (who were considered security holders) were required to lure other potential investors to the scheme, the people in
charge of the enterprise actually sold the investments. See Glenn W Turner Enters., 474
F.2d at 482-83.
43. See Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d
750 (2d Cir. 1977).
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); SEC
v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Williamson v. Tucker,
645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch
Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp.,
540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976). The First and Fourth Circuits have not had the
opportunity to decide this issue; the Eleventh Circuit has refrained from doing so. See
Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 816 & n.9 (lth Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W.
3460 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1986).
The Supreme Court has on occasion omitted the word "solely" in discussion of the
Hovey test. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979).
Nonetheless, the Court has explicitly declined to express a view on whether "solely"
should be interpreted literally or whether the essential managerial efforts test of Glenn W
Turnershould be used when applying Howey. See United House Found., Inc. v, Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 852 n. 16 (1975). If the Supreme Court were to decide this issue, however,
it would be very unlikely to follow a mechanical reading of this prong of the Howey test in
light of its mandate that the substance and not the form of an investment scheme should
govern and that the factual economic realities behind the scheme should be scrutinized.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
45. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103-04 (3d Cir.) (opinion of Garth, J.)
(citing 59 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 301-365 (Purdon Supp. 1983)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
118 (1984); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (adopting much
of the reasoning of New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (citing N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 10-11, 26 (Mc Kinney 1948)), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1977).
46. See SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); McConnell v.
Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 786 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Morrison v. Pelican
Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,863, at 94,480-81 (N.D.
I11.Aug. 20, 1982); see also Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134, 137 (N.D. I11.
1983) (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
47. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
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The Matter of Law Approach

A proponent of the matter of law approach will often look to the statutory rights of a general partner48 and assume that a general partner possesses the ability to exercise those rights and therefore has a voice in
managing partnership affairs.'
The Third Circuit recently used this
analysis in Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 50 holding, as a matter of law, that
one who holds a general partnership interest does not possess a security
for purposes of the federal securities laws."1
The plaintiff, Mr. Goodwin, was a general partner in a brokerage and
securities limited partnership.52 Goodwin brought an action alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act5 3 and Rule l0b-5.1 He claimed
that based on the defendants' false representations made to him, including the misrepresentation that the firm was not planning to merge or to
be sold, he resigned from the company.5 5 Shortly thereafter, the company was acquired by Bache, Halsey, Stuart and the value of the partnership interest he had relinquished rose considerably.5 6
Judge Garth, announcing the judgment of the court, held that plaintiff's interest in the partnership could not qualify as a security because
"the role of a general partner, by law, extends well beyond the permitted
role of a passive investor."5 7 This holding would apparently prevent any
general partner 8 from ever having an opportunity to prove that he
Ct. 118 (1984); SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Hirsch v.
duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49. See Goodwin v. Elkins, 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.) (opinion of Garth, J.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp.
1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); cf Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Mich.
1980), aff'd, 701 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1982).
50. 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984). While Judge Garth
announced the judgment of the court, his analysis with regard to the matter of law approach was not shared by his colleagues. Id. at 103.
51. See id. at 108 (Garth, J.).
52. Id. at 101 (Garth, J.).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
55. Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 101 (Garth, J.).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 103 (Garth, J.) (emphasis in original). Judge Garth went a step further,
characterizing as dicta the parts of Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981), which stated that some forms of general partnership interests could be securities. See Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 106 n.11 (Garth, J.). In his view
Williamson only stands for the proposition that for a case to be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff's claims must be made solely to obtain federal
jurisdiction. Id. Regardless of the accuracy of this argument, the Williamson analysis
has been quoted and adopted by many other courts. See infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
58. Although Judge Garth's conclusion that Mr. Goodwin's general partnership interest was not a security was probably correct even under Williamson, his analysis was
overinclusive.
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owned a security in the form of an investment contract by satisfying the
requirements of the Howey test.

Judge Garth based his opinion on the statutory rights and powers
granted the general partner,59 reasoning that a partnership agreement
could not so diminish these statutory powers as to make the general partnership interest a security.6 0 His opinion discussed many provisions of
the Pennsylvania Partnership Act6" to demonstrate the extensive powers
of a general partner and to conclude that one who has such powers cannot have expected to receive profits solely from the efforts of others.6 2
The partnership rights and duties emphasized by Judge Garth's opinion are those of the general partners with respect to third parties, 63 not
the rights of the partners among themselves to control and manage the

business of the partnership. Hence, these rights do not necessarily give
the general partner access to the kind of information that would help the
general partner protect himself. The fourth prong of the Howey test, as
interpreted by Glenn W. Turner, considers the partner's actual control
over the management of the enterprise to determine whether profits are
expected from the efforts of others.' The Garth analysis, however, does
not acknowledge the relevance of the actual functioning and managing of
59. See Goodwin v. Elkins, 730 F.2d 99, 103-04 & n.7 (3d Cir.) (Garth, J.) (citing 59
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 301-365 (Purdon Supp. 1983)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118
(1984).
60. Id. at 104. Other courts at times have followed an analysis similar to Judge
Garth's opinion in Goodwin. In New York Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) the court stated that general partners are not passive investors and
therefore could not be considered investors in securities. See id. at 1314. The court emphasized that a partner's responsibility under New York partnership law for acts of the
partnership could not be diminished even if the general partner chose to delegate his
duties. See id. The court did not extensively analyze the fourth prong of the Howey test,
but stated that whether a general partnership interest is a security "does not and should
not hinge on the particular degree of responsibility he assumes within the firm." Id.; see
also Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (adopting the Sloan
reasoning), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). The court in Hirsch noted that the rights
and duties granted by the partnership articles were not a sham designed to evade the
strictures of the Howey test.
61. 59 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 301-365 (Purdon Supp. 1983). Judge Garth particularly noted certain rights under this act, including: each general partner can bind the
partnership while conducting business with third parties; each partner has unlimited liability for partnership losses; the partnership is liable for wrongful acts or breaches of trust
by partners; and notice to one general partner is equal to notice to the entire partnership.
See Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 104.
62. See Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 104 (Garth, J.). Judge Garth noted that even if the
Elkins partnership agreement contained the most draconian restrictions on the rights of
the nonmanaging general partners, these partners would still have enough legal power
and responsibility to preclude such interests from being considered securities. See id. at
107.
63. See supra note 61.
64. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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5

the partnership.1

B.

The FactualReality Approach

Courts employing the factual reality approach6 6 look beyond the rights
of a general partner as set forth by statute or by the partnership agreement to scrutinize the partner's ability to manage the partnership. 67
These courts seek to determine whether the investing general partner actually depends
on the managing efforts of others to control partnership
68
affairs.
This approach was initially set forth in Williamson v. Tucker,69 in
which the Fifth Circuit described three sets of circumstances under
which a general partnership interest could appropriately be treated as a
security. 0 These circumstances were referred to by the court as examples of situations that would give rise to an investor's dependence on the
promoter?1' These examples were not considered exhaustive."2
The Fifth Circuit's analysis requires an evaluation of the capabilities of
the general partner to determine whether the investing general partner
65. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 100-08 (3d Cir.) (Garth, J.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984).
In contrast, the concurring opinions of Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Becker were not
based on the statutory rights afforded general partners but on the particular partnership
agreement at hand. See id. at 111-13 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); id. at 113-14 (Becker, J.,
concurring). They both stop short of the broad sweep of the opinion announcing the
judgment of the court, reasoning that it was unnecessary to decide whether the statutory
rights granted to general partners were substantial enough to preclude a general partner
from claiming that his interest was a security. See id. at 112 (Seitz, CJ., concurring); id.
at 114 (Becker, J., concurring).
66. See, e.g., SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984); Gordon v.
Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); McConnell v. Frank
Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Rogers v. Cowley, [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,178 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1983); Morrison
v. Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 20, 1982).
67. See, e.g., McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 786 (N.D.
Cal. 1983); Rogers v. Cowley, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,178, at 95,684 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1983); Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863, at 94,481 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 20, 1982).
68. See, e.g., Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Gordon
v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Pfohl v.
Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134, 137 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
69. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
70. See id. at 424. The Fifth Circuit's analysis is applicable to joint venture interests
as well. The two business forms are quite similar, and most states apply many of the rules
of partnership law to joint ventures. The joint venture, however, is normally established
to perform a particular undertaking and is usually dissolved on completion while the
partnership is a more permanent entity. See generally J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra
note 34, § 35, at 189-95; H. Henn & J. Alexander, Law of Corporations § 49, at 105-09
(1983); H. Reuschlein & W. Gregory, Agency & Partnership, § 266, at 441-46 (1979).
71. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
72. Id. at 424 n.15.
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expected to rely on the efforts of others for profits.7" This scrutiny would
be appropriate even though the actual partnership agreement seemed to
provide all general partners with the power to control the business.7 4
One aim of the Williamson analysis is to determine whether the partnership agreement accurately reflects the behavior and abilities of the general partners. 7
Under Williamson, a general partnership interest can be considered a
security if
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands
of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes
power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is
so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or
(3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he
cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise
meaningful partnership or venture powers.7 6
The Fifth Circuit thus seems to acknowledge that a general partnership
73. See id. at 423.

74. Id. at 424.
75. See id.

76. Id. The first example may be of questionable validity because it assumes that all
limited partnership interests qualify as securities and therefore a partnership agreement
that distributes power as would a limited partnership should also be construed as creating
a security. For cases holding that limited partnership interests are not securities, see
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 595 F. Supp. 800,
807 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (since partnership agreement gave limited partner partnership powers, hotel developers' limited partnership agreement was not a security for purposes of
federal securities laws); Darrah v. Garrett, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,472, at 98,365 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 1984) (because they exercised control
over the profit and loss potential of their investments limited partners' interests were not
securities).
A more precise analysis, however, would determine whether the specific partnership
interest, limited or general, meets the four criteria of an investment contract as set forth
in Howey. This is necessary because the limited partner label does not always accurately
reflect the powers of the investor, just as the general partner label does not always accurately reflect the powers of a general partner. See Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 740-41
& n.5 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
If instead, this first example were reworded to state that a general partnership interest
should be considered a security if "an agreement among the parties distributes power as
would normally be possessed by a classic limited partner," the Howey requirements
would definitely be satisfied because classic limited partnership interests will pass the
Howey test. See Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1983) (limited
partnership interests are generally securities under Howey); SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d
130, 137 (7th Cir. 1982) (limited partnership interests were securities); SEC v. Murphy,
626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-09
(7th Cir. 1978) (court held as a matter of law that limited partnership interest was a
security because on its face the interest met all the requirements of Howey), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 939 (1979); McGreghar Land Co. v. Meguiar, 521 F.2d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1975)
(limited partnership interests were securities); Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Serv., Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1209, 1224 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (undisputed facts of case allowed court to conclude that limited partnership interests were securities), aff'd, 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.
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interest is denied securities protection only if the partner possesses both
the designated right and the actual ability to control his investment in the
partnership.77
Unfortunately for the joint venturers in Williamson, the court was unable to find investor dependence sufficient to qualify the interests as securities. Three people each owned undivided one-third interests in a 160acre tract of land near the proposed site of the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. 78 As a result of a series of transactions, three separate joint venture
groups bought new undivided one-third interests in the property. 79 The
transactions were arranged by Godwin Investments, which had
purchased an interest in the property and then attracted potential investors to participate in the joint venture. 0 As part of its scheme, Godwin
Investments represented that it would perform all management duties to
"assure the maximum profit potential of each investment." 8
In its analysis, the court noted that the partnership agreement allocated powers sufficient to give the venturers the right to control their
investment.8" In addition, the plaintiffs were capable of exercising such
control because of their considerable business experience and the knowl1981). The SEC has also supported this view. See Securities Act Release No. 33-4377, 1
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1046, at 2062-63 (Aug. 8, 1967).
If a general partner acquires a limited partnership interest before he becomes a general
partner, it is arguable that his limited partnership interest should be considered a security
even though he participates in the management of the business because he may have
expected profits to be generated through the efforts of others at the time of the purchase.
Compare Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiffs' limited
partnership interests were considered separately from their general partnership interests
because both were purchased at the same time and fraudulent inducements to purchase
the limited partnership interests were allegedly made before plaintiffs became general
partners), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977) with Frazier v. Manson, 651 F.2d 1078,
1080-81 (5th Cir. 1981) (a partner in a general partnership which later became the general partner of limited partnerships was not allowed to isolate his general and limited
partnership interests and therefore his limited partnership interest was not a security).
Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (U.L.P.A.) provides that a limited
partner will lose his limited liability if he takes part in the control of the business. See
U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916). What constitutes control, however, is not clear. See Feld, The
"Control" Test for Limited Partnerships,82 Harv. L. Rev. 1471 (1969) (arguing that

under the U.L.P.A. no adequate standard of control has emerged). The Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (R.U.L.P.A.) takes the same view, but provides that certain acts
of a limited partner will not be considered control. For example, § 303(2) states that a
limited partner will not be deemed to participate in the control of the partnership if he
consults with and advises a general partner with respect to the business of the limited
partnership. See R.U.L.P.A. § 303(2) (1976). This notion may not be consistent with the
general rule that a classic limited partnership interest will be considered a security under
the Howey test.
77. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981).
78. Id. at 407.
79. Id. at 407-08.
80. Id. at 408.
81. Id. (capitalization omitted).
82. See id. at 424.
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edge they had acquired as real estate venturers.8 3 Last, the court found
that since the plaintiffs were capable of replacing the management of
Godwin Investments, they were
not solely dependent on that manage84
ment to operate the scheme.
Williamson thus precludes finding a general partnership interest to be
a security if the investor's right to control the enterprise is accompanied
by the actual ability to control the enterprise.8 5 It recognizes that if the
general partner retains substantial power and the capacity to exercise it,
his general partnership interest will not be deemed a security. Thus, the
Williamson approach is consistent with the view that the securities laws
were not enacted to protect against all fraud 6 and would not provide
federal securities laws protection to classic general partners. Williamson
will, however, protect the truly passive investor even though he is termed
a general partner.
The Securities and Exchange Commission87 and many federal courts"
have endorsed the Williamson approach. Courts that employ it do so as
an extension of the "efforts" or "solely" prong of the Howey test. For
example, in Morrison v. Pelican Land Development,89 the District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois relied on the second9" and third9
83. Id. at 424-25.

84. See id. at 425.
85. The investor's right to control the enterprise refers to a de jure right while his
actual ability to do so refers to a de facto condition.
86. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (1985); Marine Bank
v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir, 1983)
(per curiam); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 744 (1Ith Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1983); Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 701 F.2d
176 (6th Cir. 1982); cf. Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974)
("We doubt that Congress intended by these Acts to render federal judges the guardians
of all beguiled makers or payees.").
87. See, e.g., FCA Realty Fund, No-Action Letter, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %77,841, at 79,234 (available Nov. 13, 1984); Realex Capital Corp.,
No-Action Letter, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,611, at 78,843
(available Mar. 19, 1984); Riverbottom Land Co., No-Action Letter (Available Dec. 27,
1982, on LEXIS Fedsec Library, Noact file).
While the opinion of an administrative agency such as the SEC can be quite persuasive
and is often given great weight, it is not binding on the courts. See International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979).
88. See, e.g., SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Odom v.
Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210,
213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp.
781, 785-86 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134, 137 (N.D. I11.
1983); Rogers v. Cowley, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,178,
at 95,684 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1983); Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., (1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863, at 94,480-81 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982); Fund
of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
89. [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %98,863 (N.D. I11.Aug. 20,
1982).
90. Id. at 94,481; see Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424 ("the partner or venturer is so
inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently
exercising his partnership or venture powers").
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examples of the Williamson analysis. The plaintiff, a Chicago police officer with a high school education,9 2 became one of nineteen general partners in Pelican Land Development by investing over S100,000.1 3 He
claimed he decided to invest in the development after the defendant, his
lawyer, lied to him about it.94 The defendants argued that plaintiff's general partnership interest gave him a right to control the partnership equal
to that of the other general partners.9 5 Plaintiff contended that he could
exercise no real control over the venture because he lacked the expertise,9 6 and that he actually depended on the managing partners, to whom
the partnership agreement gave the power to control the day-to-day affairs of the partnership.97 The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment because it was a disputed issue of fact whether the second
and third examples of Williamson were satisfied. 9"
III.

THE SECURITIES STATUS OF GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
INTERESTS: A PROPOSED SEQUENCE OF ANALYSIS

The alternative approaches to determining the securities status of general partnership interests vary markedly in their sensitivity to the substance of the investment at issue. The matter of law approach99 rigidly
refuses to inquire beyond the face of an investment agreement which
takes the general partnership form. It makes only a truncated inquiry,
correctly commencing with scrutiny of form, but failing to pierce beyond
it. The factual reality approach" °° articulated in Williamson recognizes
that despite the appearance of the general partnership agreement, a general partner, because of his lack of expertise or ability, or because of his
dependence on others may actually be a passive investor who merits the
91. Morrison, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 94,481; see Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424 ("the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the
manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers") (footnote omitted).
92. Morrison, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 94,480.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 94,480 & n. 1.
98. See id. at 94,481. In a similar context, the District Court for the Northern District of California used the Williamson analysis to deny a motion for summary judgment.
See McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 786-87 (N.D. Cal.
1983). The plaintiffs, who were designated as nonmanaging general partners of a real
estate venture, claimed that they were defrauded, and sued under the 1934 Act (appending many state law claims). Id. at 782-83. In denying the motion, the court noted
that both the contract and the factual necessity must be scrutinized to determine whether
the partners were able to exercise some control over the management of the venture. Id.
at 786; see also Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742-43 (11th Cir. 1982) (whether defendant's skills created dependency as set forth in Williamson was an issue of fact), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
99. See supra Part II.A.
100. See supra Part II.B.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

protections of the securities laws.'
A.

The Three Stage Analysis

To ensure that the true relationship between the general partner and
the partnership is revealed, an examination of the partnership interest
should proceed well beyond the face of the agreement. 10 2 Accordingly,
this Note proposes a three stage analysis. 0 3
Each stage focuses on a different kind of evidence, with each stage
serving as a threshold to the next."°
Stage One. The partnershipagreement. Inquiry should begin with an
assessment of the balance of powers within the partnership, 10 5 scrutinizing the partnership agreement to determine whether the powers, rights
and responsibilities granted the general partner would enable him to exercise a voice in the management and control of the partnership, thus
helping to further its goals.' 0 6 This scrutiny helps determine the intent
or expectation of the general partners.
Stage Two. Conduct and behavior of generalpartner. The conduct
and behavior of the general partner should be examined to determine
0
whether his actions are consistent with the partnership agreement.' 7
Stage Three. Sophistication of generalpartner. The general partner's
level of sophistication regarding the particular business of the partnership should be evaluated to determine whether his experience and knowledge would provide him with the ability to make an independent
101. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
102. Id. at 424; see Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1973) ("It
would seem that only through examining all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
agreement could the Supreme Court's mandate to emphasize economic reality be given
full effect."); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 786 (N.D. Cal.
1983) ("Although an enterprise may be a partnership or a joint venture in form, it may be
considered the equivalent of a limited partnership under Williamson because by contract
or factual necessity certain partners have little or no control over the management of the
enterprise.").
103. The proposed test adopts many of the ideas behind the Howey test and the Williamson analysis. It should be employed only after the first three prongs of the Howey test
have been satisfied.
104. For discussion of the rationale supporting this analysis, see infra Part III.B.
105. U.P.A. § 18 (1914), which sets forth the rules that determine the rights and duties
of partners, assumes that the rights and duties of the partners "shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them." Id.
While a written agreement will be strong evidence of the general partner's intent, the
partnership agreement need not be in writing. See Bailes v. Bailes, 261 Ark. 389, 391,
549 S.W.2d 69, 71 (1977); Stein v. Jung, 492 S.W.2d 139, 144 (Mo. App. 1973). A security might exist even without a written agreement. See SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709,
722 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
106. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
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contribution toward the management and control of the partnership. 0 8
1. Establishing the Rebuttable Presumptions: Stage One
The proposed analysis begins" 9 under Stage One with a facial scrutiny
of the partnership agreement to assess the powers granted to the complaining general partner.1 0 Stage One will set up one of two presumptions, while Stages Two and Three will afford the opportunity to rebut
that presumption.
If, in the partnership agreement, the Complaining general partner is
found to have no powers' 1 ' or only nominal or ministerial powers," 2 he
will be presumed to be a security holder'I 3 and the burden will be on the
108. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
109. Under the proposed analysis, the determination of whether a general partnership
interest is a security is a mixed question of law and fact. If the material facts are undisputed, the issue may be resolved summarily by the court. If there are disputed issues of
fact material to the determination of whether a security exists, the court will not resolve
the issue summarily. See Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp.
781, 786-87 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 98,863, at 94,481 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982); cf. SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (" [n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached [by the 1933 Act] if it be proved as a
matter offact that they [are] ... investment contracts") (emphasis added).
110. See Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (beginning analysis with
partnership agreement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, all partners shall have equal rights in
the management and conduct of the partnership business. U.P.A. § 18(e) (1914).
111. The partnership agreement may, in rare instances, vest all the managerial authority in a distinct group of partners or explicitly deny certain partners the right to any voice
in partnership affairs. See McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781,
783 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (agreement granting managing partners exclusive management authority over operations); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(partnership agreement may provide that certain general partners have no legal right to a
voice in partnership matters), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Pawgan v. Silverstein,
265 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (general partnership agreement vested all managerial and controlling authority in hands of managing partners) (incorporating facts of
United States v. Silverstein, 237 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 344 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 828 (1965)). This should not be confused with the situation in
which a general partner chooses to delegate some of the managerial control of the partnership to a managing or executive committee or to a managing partner. Cf. J. Mulder,
M. Volz & A. Berger, supra note 33, at 73 (management is frequently delegated to some
partners).
112. Cf. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1974)
(investor agreed to do certain minimal tasks in exchange for a share in proceeds); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973).
Even if it is found under Stage Two that the general partner is performing some partnership task that was not reflected in the partnership agreement he will still be presumed
a security holder if the task was only nominal or ministerial.
113. The intent and good faith of the promoter may also be considered as part of the
assessment of the partnership agreement. Evidence that the promoter intended to avoid
the securities laws by granting either illusory or inconsequential powers and responsibilities should figure in the court's initial characterization of the partnership interest at issue.
Such evidence, however, may be difficult to establish.
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defendant, under Stage Two, to rebut that presumption by proving that
the general partner actually exercised or expected to exercise real part-

nership power. If the complaining general partner does possess significant power on the face of the partnership agreement,' 1 4 he will be
presumed to be a classic general partner and therefore not a security
holder. It will be his burden to overcome this presumption. The general
partner will be able to satisfy his burden if he can prove under Stage Two
that he did not exercise his powers and under Stage Three that he did not
have the capacity to exercise this power independently.
2.

Comparing the Partnership Agreement to the Complaining
General Partner's Behavior: Stage Two

If defendant can prove under Stage Two that the complaining partner's behavior does not truly reflect the apparently powerless position
defined in the partnership agreement and that in fact the general partner
participated in the management or control of the partnership, the partnership agreement will be deemed waived or modified, and no security

will exist. 1 5 This may be shown, for example, if the defendant can prove

114. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 105 (3d Cir.) ("[T]he Partnership Agreement provides that any general partner may participate in the nomination,
election, or removal of the Executive committee and the Managing Partner .... The
general partners as a group also maintain ultimate managerial control through oversight
of the Executive Committee and the Managing Partner.... General partners must approve new admissions into the partnership and involuntary terminations of the partnership."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 n.5 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (agreement permits partners to control, by majority vote, decisions regarding
partnership property), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 424 (5th Cir.) (partnership agreement allowed investors to exercise ultimate control),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863, at 94,480 n.l (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982) (partnership
agreement clearly gave the complaining general partner a right to control the partnership
affairs equal to that of all other partners subject only to the managing partners' "day to
day" control over the partnership); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 595 F. Supp. 800, 806 & n. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (general partners were not
authorized to act unless their acts had first been approved); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F.
Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (disputes resolved by a majority in interest of the
general partners, with the interest of each general partner based on the number of voting
units he held); Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (joint
venture agreement showed that most managerial decisions must be approved by both
parties).
115. Because the relevant portions of the partnership agreement have been waived or
modified, the partnership agreement can no longer be looked at as prime evidence of the
general partner's intent or expectations. On the contrary, the general partner's present
behavior may now become persuasive evidence of his expectation regarding management.
Thus, if a general partner exercises partnership powers, it will usually be justifiable to
conclude that he expected to exercise these powers.
The investing general partner should be on notice that he has significant rights and the
potential to exercise a voice in the control of partnership affairs because he purchased a
general partnership interest. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). Therefore, if he chooses to exercise his partnership powers,
he will be deemed to have expected that he had these powers and was waiting for the
opportunity to exercise them, unless he can prove otherwise.

1985]

PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS AS SECURITIES

323

that the complaining partner was actually involved in the day-to-day
managing of the business116 or was consulted and gave his advice and
opinions on the management and control of the partnership.I" This may
also be shown if it can be proved that the general partner actually had
some significant decision making responsibility not reflected in the partnership agreement.1 1
Most partnership agreements will grant general partners more than
negligible powers and responsibilities.' 19 When this is the case, Stage
One makes it necessary to determine whether these distributed powers
and responsibilities would enable the general partner to have a voice in
the management and control of the partnership. Where Stage One finds
that voice, the complaining general partner will be required to rebut the
presumption that he is a classic general partner and not a security holder.
To do this, he will have to prove under Stage Two that he did not exercise his apportioned12 powers and under Stage Three that his nonuse of
apparent powers arose from a lack of personal ability to do so. 2 '
116. See Slevin v. Pedersen Assocs., 540 F. Supp. 437, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (joint venture interest not considered an investment contract even though it may not have been
foreseen at time of original agreement that plaintiff would contribute to management of
the business because when he saw that the venture was not being run correctly, he rendered his services to the scheme); Goodman v. DeAzoulay, 539 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (joint venturer who actively participated in company activities and paid personal bills with company funds was not a security holder); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v.
Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (because plaintiff was to
be actively involved in the operation of the business no security was found to exist);
Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D. Utah 1968) ("it clearly appears that plaintiff... was a participant in a joint venture, the success of which depended
to an important degree upon his services and activity in the venture"). But see Rogers v.
Cowley, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,178, at 95,684 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 14, 1983) (although plaintiff was a minority director and worked as the manager of a racquetball facility, he had no ultimate control over the significant managerial
policies and decisions and therefore his stock purchases were considered investment contracts and thus securities).
117. Cf. Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973) (joint venture interest
was found to be a security even though contract referred to plaintiff as a consultant,
because he had no real managerial status).
118. Cf. SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1984) (while joint
venture agreement stated all joint venturers were to have a voice in major decisions affecting the venture, evidence showed that some investors were entirely passive); Schultz v.
Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff retained ultimate control over
apartment complex and continued to exercise supervisory rights).
119. See supra notes 7, 114 and accompanying text.
120. See eg., SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984) (evidence
demonstrated that some investors were entirely passive); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367,
375 (10th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's consultant role was purely nominal as he had no managerial status and was treated as an outsider); Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863, at 94,480 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1982) (partner
claimed that in reality he exercised no control over the development).
121. See Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Gordon v.
Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741-42 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); McConnell
v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Pfohl v.
Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134, 137 (N.D. 111. 1983); Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev.,
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3. Sophistication of the Complaining General Partner: Stage Three
When previous analysis finds an agreement that gives power, but also

that the plaintiff exhibited only passive behavior, the reason for this discrepancy must be determined. In such cases Stage Three will determine
whether the general partner simply chose not to exercise his powers 22 or
whether
his powers were illusory because he was unable to exercise
23
them. 1

Under Stage Three,124 the general partner's level of sophistication regarding the particular business of the partnership will be evaluated. Such
scrutiny will determine whether the general partner is sophisticated
enough to be able to exercise a meaningful voice in controlling and man-

aging the affairs of the partnership or whether he is actually dependent
on others to exercise this power.
The second and third examples of Williamson suggest the nature of the
inquiry needed here to penetrate the factual reality behind the operation
of the partnership. Williamson instructs us to evaluate the general partner's past experience and knowledge in the particular business of the
partnership as an indicator of his potential influence on partnership affairs. 2 Overall investment knowledge will not be a factor sufficient to
establish classic general partner status unless such knowledge is significant to the management and control of the particular partnership.
Alternatively, Williamson suggests that the court inquire into the general partner's dependence on the promoter. 126 If the promoter possesses
such unique, irreplaceable skills that the general partner is at his mercy
[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,863, at 94,481 (N.D. I1l. Aug. 20,
1982).
122. See Elson v. Geiger, 506 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (plaintiffs possessed
significant managerial roles under the partnership documents but chose not to exercise
any managerial functions), aff'd, 701 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1982); New York Stock Exch. v.
Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (even though a general partner chose to
delegate his managerial responsibilities to a committee, he still had the right to a voice in
partnership matters); see also Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1978)
(investor retained ultimate control over apartment complex but chose to delegate his responsibility to an agent); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration,
Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 1976) (agreement gave defendants considerable operating power and defendants were skilled and should have been able to use this power),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th
Cir. 1976) (investor had power to control business and whether it was exercised was
irrelevant); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak Co., 460 F.2d 666, 669-70 (10th Cir. 1972)
(franchise agreement was not an investment contract where franchisee retained certain
powers but simply chose to let franchisor operate the restaurant).
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
124. Since Stage Three calls for a subjective inquiry into the background of the complaining general partners involved in the scheme, it is possible for some general partners
to possess securities while others do not, within the confines of the same investment
scheme. See Brodsky, General Partner'sInterest as a Security, 189 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 2,

1983, at 1, col. 1.
125. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424-25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
897 (1981).
126. See id. at 424.
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and unable
to replace him, the general partner may be deemed to hold a
27
security.1
If it is determined under Stage Three that a general partner has the
sophistication and ability to contribute to the management and control of
the partnership independently but simply chose not to exercise this
power or decided to delegate it, he wil not have overcome the presumption that he is a classic general partner in fact, and his interest will not be
a security. If it is found, however, that he does not have the capacity to
exercise his partnership power, he2 will
have met his burden and his inter8
est will be considered a security.1
B. Williamson and the Three Stage Analysis
The factual reality approach set forth in Williamson points out certain
issues to be considered when analyzing the security status of general
partnership interests. The three stage analysis proposed here adopts
many of the ideas of Williamson but also presents a concrete sequence of
analysis to determine the factual realities behind each partnership.
By adopting the proposed three stage analysis, courts would put promoters on notice that the regulatory requirements and the potential liabilities imposed by the federal securities laws may be applicable to their
investment enterprises even when couched in the form of a general partnership.' 29 Those promoters who want to use the general partnership
form of business will be forewarned that immunity from securities protection is only available if investors are reasonably sophisticated in the
particular business of the partnership and have the knowledge and capacity necessary to protect their interests without the aid of the federal securities laws. The specific multistage analysis will give promoters
standards and predictability regarding acceptable and unacceptable arrangements and the potential consequences and liabilities of establishing
an investment venture in the form of a general partnership. 130 Requiring
127. It must be emphasized that Williamson does not require the general partner to

prove that the promoter possesses such irreplaceable skills. Rather, offer of such proof
will be one way the general partner may establish his dependency on the promoter.
128. Merely because a general partner is not able to control the outcome of partnership
affairs because he has a minority vote will not automatically make him a security holder.
The classic general partner's vote coupled with his level of sophistication in dealing with
the business affairs of the partnership would give him influence over the partnership and
sufficient control to allow him to protect his interest.
129. The Supreme Court is reluctant to find the existence of a security where an investment is already comprehensively regulated on the federal level. See Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982) (bank certificate of deposit regulated by federal
banking laws); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979)
(employee pension plans regulated by ERISA); see also Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1984) (expanding idea to include a foreign government's regulatory structure where this structure provided certificate holders with
same degree of protection against insolvency as does U.S. banking system), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 784 (1985).
130. To protect themselves, promoters should draft a warranty and indemnity agreement wherein the general partner represents his degree of knowledge and experience re-
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that all three elements of the analysis be satisfied will also offer promoters
protection from inappropriate liability by making the elevation of the
partnership contract to securities status difficult.
To the bona fide passive investors who have been defrauded by unscrupulous promoters, the proposed three stage factual reality test provides
an opportunity to use the remedies provided by the securities acts even
though the investments at issue are nominally in the general partnership
form. The would-be plaintiff is provided with standards for evaluating
the potential of his lawsuit.
The proposed test would be consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate that the form of an investment vehicle should not be allowed to
camouflage the actual substance and economic reality of the scheme. 13 ,
It would also further the congressional intent behind the securities laws:
"[t]o define the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so
as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that' in
32
our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."'
CONCLUSION

When a general partner does not have the power or ability to have any
voice in the management of partnership affairs, his general partnership
interest should be considered a security. If it is not, promoters may be
encouraged to create investment vehicles in the form of general partnership interests in an effort to bypass the federal securities laws. While
most general partners will not be able to overcome the high burden of
proof necessary to establish that their partnership interest constitutes a
security, those general partners who truly are passive investors should
not be deprived of the protections to which they are entitled.
Douglas M. Fried
garding the particular business of the partnership. Cf Morgenstern, Real Estate Joint
Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications of Williamson v. Tucker, 59 Wash.
U.L.Q. 1231, 1265 (1982) (promoters should document investors' capabilities).
13 1. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349-51 (1943).
132. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).

